Abstract-The integrity of shipments in the supply chain may have to be tracked remotely by carriers that are not necessarily trusted. We present an RFID framework architecture for applications when multiple scanned tags generate concurrently a proof of "simultaneous" presence that cannot be forged by untrusted carriers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a wireless technology widely deployed for inventory, retail and supply chain management. There are many advantages of RFID over barcode technology: e.g., RFID does not require line-of-sight alignment with readers for proper scanning and RFID tags can be interrogated at greater distances, faster and concurrently [1] . RFID tags and sensors can also be used to enable computers to observe/identify/understand for situational awareness without the limitations of a human in the loop. Furthermore RFID technology extends the scope of the Internet of Things to capture intelligent processes and cyber-physical applications.
Although initial designs of RFID protocols focused on performance and efficiency, this technology has found use in many applications that require the implementation of security mechanisms. The recent ratification of the standard Gen2v2 highlights these security concerns [2] . Several RFID authentication protocols that address security have been proposed in the literature. Most use hash functions [3] , [4] , [5] , and others use pseudorandom functions [6] , [7] . The Flyweight authentication protocol [8] is one of a few which only requires a pseudorandom number generator.
For supply chain management, RFID tags have to be tracked remotely. Ownership Transfer Protocols may be used but there are cases when the owner does not want to cede control. For example, the owner may use the services provided by a carrier who, in turn, uses other carriers. In such cases it is desirable that the owner and carrier can periodically check the integrity of a shipment of tagged products. This requirement is known as group-scanning and involves the tags of a group generating a proof of simultaneous presence in the range of an RFID reader [9] .
There are several practical scenarios where group scanning can substantially expand the capabilities of RFID-based systems. For example, some products may need to be shipped together in groups and one may want to monitor their progress through the supply chain-e.g., hardware components of a system or kits. Alternatively, safety regulations may require that drugs be shipped, or dispensed, together with information leaflets. Since public key cryptography is beyond the capability of most RFID tags, such proofs can only be checked by a verifier that shares private information with the group of tags (GoT).
Our main contribution in this paper is to: a) Present a framework for group-scanning that addresses practical settings, in particular supply chain management. b) Present a lightweight group-scanning proof that is generated concurrently by tags of a group without sharing any private information with the reader. The organization of this paper is as follows. The literature is reviewed in Section II. In Section III we discuss RFID deployments for supply chain management and present a highlevel description of the security requirements and procedures for group scanning, and discuss the threat model. In Section IV we propose two RFID protocols for group scanning: a nonanonymous group-scanning proof and a version that adds support for anonymity. In Section V we show how these can be integrated into RFID supply chain management systems.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Group-Scanning Proofs
Ari Juels introduced in 2004 the security context of a new RFID application-which he called a yoking-proof [10] , that generates evidence of simultaneous presence of two tags in the range of an RFID reader. This first protocol was later found to be insecure [11] , but the simultaneous scanning application triggered considerable interest in the research community. Yoking-proofs have been extended to group-scanning proofs in which multiple tags prove simultaneous presence in the range of an RFID reader.
Burmester et al. presented a group-scanning proof that uses randomized pseudonyms and updates secret keys after each session for forward-secrecy [12] . This is essentially a proofof-concept and not appropriate for lightweight applications. Huang and Ku [13] presented a group-scanning proof for low-cost tags that uses a pseudorandom number generator to authenticate flows and a cyclic redundancy code to randomize strings. This has several weaknesses, some of which were addressed by Chien et al. [14] who, in turn, proposed a new group-scanning proof. Peris-Lopez et al. [15] found other security flaws in these protocols and proposed security guidelines. More recently, Liu et al. proposed a group-scanning proof for multiple readers and tags [9] . This proof requires the reader to be a contributing party that shares private keys with the tags of the group.
III. A GROUP-SCANNING ARCHITECTURE
A. Group-Scanning Deployments
A typical deployment of an RFID supply chain involves three types of legitimate entities. a) A group of tags (GoT).
b) The owner of GoT, who keeps the digital rights of the tags; in particular the owner knows the private information stored by the tags. c) The carrier, whose services are contracted by the owner.
The carrier has physical possession of the GoT, can access it through his reader(s) and should be able to check its integrity, but does not have control over it.
B. Group-Scanning Capabilities
We assume the following regarding the environment that characterizes RFID group-scanning applications.
1) RFID Tag Capabilities: Passive UHF tags are the most common for supply chain applications. They have no power of their own, operate in the far assumptfield, and use backscatter communication. Such tags work at greater distances (than inductive tags) but the delivered power is low, and therefore lightweight cryptographic tools should be utilized. However, we shall assume that tags are able to perform basic symmetrickey cryptographic operations such as selecting pseudorandom numbers and evaluating a pseudorandom function.
Public key cryptography, tamper-resistant shielding and onboard clocks are beyond the capabilities of most tags. However, the activity time span of a tag during a single session can be limited using techniques such as measuring the discharge rate of capacitors [10] .
2) RFID Reader and Verifier/Server Capabilities: Readers and verifiers/servers are able to perform complex cryptographic operations. Although in practice these may be implemented on the same device with two communication ports, in our model we shall regard them as independent. In particular, readers just manage the communication between tags, and interface between the verifier and the GoT.
3) RFID Communication Channels:
Tags can only communicate with readers that are in wireless range (they backscatter the reader's electromagnetic signal). Thus, direct communication between passive RFID tags is not possible. However readers can establish logical wireless channels that link the tags of a group.
To establish a channel, the tags must provide the reader with identifying origin information to define an association. After the tags get identified (not necessarily authenticated), they get linked with a wireless communication channel via the reader (in practice: origin and destination tag information is appended to all exchanged messages). We shall not discuss physical/link layer details such as the coupling design, the power-up and collision arbitration processes. For details on these issues the reader is referred to [2] .
RFID wireless channels are particularly vulnerable because tags are restricted to lightweight cryptogra-phic protection. By contrast, the communication channel between high level entities (readers and verifiers) is secure since fully-fledged cryptographic techniques can be used.
4) Integrity of Group-Scanning Proofs:
A group-scanning proof provides evidence of temporal events that corroborate the "simultaneous" presence of a GoT. Let G be a noncompromised GoT and R an authorized reader. There are two basic integrity requirements regarding interrogation evidence and how it is compiled:
• (Completeness) If all tags of G are in range of R within the same time window then a group-scanning proof is generated.
• (Soundness) If when R interrogates the tags of G a groupscanning proof is generated then all tags of G were scanned by R.
C. Guideline Assumptions
We discuss the guideline assumptions for the groupscanning problem we shall use to design our protocol.
Assumption 1. The verifier has batch online access.
Checking the integrity of a GoT in a fully interactive mode is straight-forward, since the verifier can send/receive messages to/from specific tags directly. By contrast, in batch online mode the interactions of the verifier are restricted to: i) broadcasting a challenge that is valid for a short time span and, ii) collecting responses from the tags (via intermediate readers) to check the simultaneous presence of the tags of a group. In this mode the verifier never unicasts messages to specific tags.
Assumption 2.
The reader is a communication enabler that links the tags of GoT via reliable channels, but is not involved in any tag computation, or share a private key with the tags.
Assumption 3. The tags of a group have similar hardware capabilities and the computation load per tag for generating a group-scanning proof is balanced.
Assumption 4. The tags of a GoT are not compromised. Note that this does not mean that they cannot be compromised but that if they are, then proofs do not make sense anymore. A compromised tag T of GoT can: (i) prevent a group-scanning proof from being generated, or (ii) force a proof to be generated when GoT is not complete (via proxy tags).
Assumption 5. Group-scanning proofs apply to specific GoT: for a subgroup or extensions a different, independent proof should be sought.
Assumption 6. Group-scanning proofs use session numbers (or timestamps) to define interrogation time windows for simultaneity. RFID communication is a sequential process and therefore the concept of interrogation simultaneity can only be captured by an "exposure-time" window.
D. Threat Model 1) RFID-air interface:
Wireless channels are particularly vulnerable to adversarial threats. We assume the Dolev-Yao threat model [16] for which all protocol parties (tags, readers, owners, TTPs) and the adversary A are modeled by probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines (PPTs). A controls the communication channels, and may eavesdrop, block, modify and or inject messages in any communication between tags and readers.
2) RFID Readers and tags: We assume that (authorized) readers provide reliable communication channels for all tags in their range when requested, and do not share any private information with a GoT (Assumption 2). Authorized readers use a pseudorandom number obtained from the verifier to challenge a GoT. This serves as a session identifier and defines the corresponding validity period.
Tags are bounded by Assumptions 3 and 4. They are computationally constrained, restricted to the air interface and have no clocks other than timers.
3) Attacks on RFID Systems: Several types of attacks against RFID systems have been described in the literature. Some are well known on other platforms. In particular, the adversary may attempt to perform impersonation, DoS, interleaving and reflection attacks and other passive or active attacks. Additionally, the unique aspects of RFID applications highlight other vulnerabilities such as unauthorized tracking, a privacy concern in which the adversary tries to trace and/or recognize tags or GoTs.
There are also attacks that usually are excluded from the security model, such as online man-in-the-middle relay attacks, side channel or power analysis attacks. In particular, if no distance-bounding mechanism is used, our protocols in Section IV will be subject to active attacks that involve relaying flows between tags faster than the time window of tag timers. Such attacks affect all RFID protocols, and can only be addressed by making certain that precise timing mechanisms are used.
4) Supply Chain Management:
The owner of a GoT (a back-end server) is assumed to be a trusted entity that shares private information with the tags. The carrier is not assumed to be trusted.
IV. GROUP-SCANNING PROOFS
We describe two group-scanning proof protocols that can be integrated into a supply chain management system. Our proofs are generated distributively, without the verifier being involved and can be seen as an independent process that compiles temporal corroborative evidence given a certain input.
The parties involved are the GoT and the reader. The reader manages the communication between the tags and interfaces with the verifier. It does not share any private information with the GoT, other than an input it receives from the verifier (Assumption 2).
Elseif RN n 1 is received then set RN 1 ← RN n 1 , draw 3 successive numbers from the PRNG, discard the second one, and assign the other two to
Elseif RN n 2 is received then set RN 2 ← RN n 2 , draw 3 successive numbers from the PRNG, discard the second one, and assign the other two to
If RN 3 is received & alarm = 0, then ACCEPT and draw 3 successive numbers from the PRNG, discard the second one, and assign the other two to
successive numbers from the PRNG, discard the second one, and assign the other two to RN 1 , RN 3 Set f lg ← 0 and repeat the protocol from Step 1.
Fig. 1. Complete Triangle protocol
A. Compiling Evidence
Most group-scanning proofs in the literature link the value that each tag computes explicitly to the values the other tags compute. Our proofs use a different approach in which the values that corroborate the presence of tags are implicitly linked via a linear causality relation on the event space: (1) , so that only event(1) is needed to corroborate "simultaneous" presence. This makes the verification simpler and does not require the verifier share private information with tags.
B. The Triangle Protocol
This protocol is obtained by adapting the two party Flyweight mutual authentication protocol [8] to up to three tags T A , T B , T C , with T A a root tag and T B , T C children tags, where T A verifies the "simultaneous" presence of its children tags, while the reader is simply a communication enabler. Below we briefly describe the Triangle protocol for three tags (Figure 1) . 3 . This way, two successive tags in the triangle always share at least one random number. Figure 2 describes the Triangle protocol for only one child. Note that, although in practice RFID readers only broadcast messages (Section III-B3), they can establish logical wireless channels that link previously identified tags. Thus, in our description, for simplicity, we have assumed that the reader unicasts messages. However, if the tags do not get identified, as for the anonymous group-scanning proof in Section IV-F, then the reader "broadcasts" messages and the tags have to check the destination of such messages.
C. A Group-Scanning Proof
In this proof, a specific tag, tag 1 , the authenticator, will generate a message authentication code after checking that all tags in its group are accounted for. Tag instances are denoted as tag i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and the GoT is arranged as logical binary tree of height m = ⌈log 2 n⌉ with root tag 1 , see Figure 3 .
Our first protocol has three phases, see Figure 4 . In the first, the reader sends a pseudorandom challenge r sys and the tags respond with a group identifier ID gp and an identifying number within the group. This allows the reader to link the tags in the second phase, so that tags can unicast messages to other tags.
In the third phase, each tag a of the tree at layer j, j = m − 1, . . . , 1, sets a timer and authenticates (as root) its children by executing the Triangle protocol described above, while tag a as a child only checks and stores received messages in the higher triangle. If tag a as a root is successful, or if tag a does not have any children, then tag a assumes the role of an active child in the higher triangle (timers are used to prevent defunct states). Thus, when all tags in a layer get authenticated the READER → * : rsys (a random number)
The READER links the tags of IDgp : previous layer can get authenticated, until only one triangle rooted at tag 1 is left, or at timeout. If any triangle protocol fails (one of the tags is not authenticated) the process cannot be completed. If the triangle rooted at tag 1 gets authenticated then tag 1 sends to the reader mac = f (k; ID gp ||r sys ), where f is a secure pseudo-random function. Finally, the reader compiles the group-scanning proof: M AC = (ID gp , r sys , mac) . To validate the proof, the verifier, who keeps in a database DB pairs of values (k, ID gp ), first retrieves k from DB and then checks mac.
In this protocol each tag of the group stores (besides the flag bits) in non-volatile memory three pseudorandom numbers (if it only assumes the role of a child) or five pseudorandom numbers (if it assumes both roles, root and child), and one state (only child) or two states (child and root) of the PRNG, while the authenticator tag (only root) stores two pseudorandom numbers and one state, as well as an additional key k shared with the verifier (used to generate the mac).
Phase 1 incorporates the randomness provided by the verifier's challenge r sys which, along with the freshness of the pseudorandom numbers used by the root tags, prevent replay attacks. The pseudorandom challenge defines the scanning period for the verifier, and the number RN 1 of the authenticator tag defines the interrogation period of the GoT. In particular, the verifier cannot (without further assumptions) determine simultaneity of a group scan to a finer time interval than the scanning period. Phase 2 is used to define and link the group. And Phase 3 consists of independent, but related through the concurrent participation of tags as roots and children, executions of the Triangle protocol.
In this group-scanning proof the verifier is not authenticated which, in this particular case and from a theoretical point of view (provided that f is secure), is not a concern because the integrity of the GoT is captured by a message authentication code for the verifier, who provides the pseudorandom challenge.
We assume that the identifier ID gp , the challenge r sys , the key k, and the pseudorandom numbers, all have the same (bit) length κ, which is the security parameter of the protocol.
This protocol can be implemented very efficiently: it is distributed, each tag needs only to draw a few random numbers (but for the authenticator tag which also needs to compute a mac), and the verifier just needs to perform one check.
D. Proof of integrity
We must show that (Section III-B4) a group-scanning proof is generated if, and only if all of the tags of a noncompromised group are in the range of a reliable (Assumption 2) reader.
In [8] it is shown that the Flyweight protocol realizes mutual authentication in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. This framework supports modularity and composability (in particular, concurrency). Since the Triangle protocol is a special case of this protocol for three parties, it will realize the same functionality (but implicitly). It follows that the basic group-scanning proof that executes the Triangle protocol concurrently must also realize this functionality. Consequently a scanning-proof is generated if and only if an actual group is interrogated.
E. Session Unlinkability
An adversary that physically tracks tags can determine which protocol executions are linked to them. This cannot be prevented. Unlinkability is a feature of anonymity that protects interrogations from being linked once physical tracking is temporarily interrupted. Let A be an adversary that can interact arbitrarily with tags and readers and let Exp A be an experiment in which A is given two tag interrogations int1 and int2 (partial or completed), where int1 takes place before int2, and must decide whether the same tag was involved in both, or not. Suppose that in this experiment int1, int2 are selected [8] is a weak form of unlinkability for which we require additionally that either int1 completed, or int1, int2 are separated by a completed interrogation involving the tag of int1. This guarantees that an adversary cannot link sessions separated by a completed interrogation.
F. An Anonymous group-scanning proof
The Triangle protocol, as the Flyweight protocol on which it is based, provides session unlinkability. To capture this we modify the basic group-scanning proof by removing Phase 2 (in which the tags are linked via the reader) and have the reader broadcast all messages. Furthermore ID gp is not included in the compiled group-scanning proof. Figure 5 describes the protocol.
The elimination of Phase 2 has, as explained in Section IV-B, a significant impact on the execution of the Triangle protocol, as the messages of tags must be broadcast by the reader. Broadcast messages are checked by all tags in range, triggering a reply only by the intended destination tag (the one that accepts RN as the correct number). The verifier matches the group by exhaustive search over all pairs (k, ID gp ) in its database, by using the mac and r sys .
G. Proof of security
By using the argument in Section IV-D we get integrity. Session unlinkability is inherited from the Flyweight protocol that (also) realizes this functionality in the UC framework [8] .
V. SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
Our group-scanning proofs can be integrated into a highlevel supply chain management system in which the owner shares with each GoT a group identifier and a private key (ID gp , k) stored in a database DB, while the carrier does not share any private information with GoT. To check the integrity of tagged products with online batch connectivity, the owner generates a pseudorandom challenge r sys = r o and queries the GoT via the carrier. The GoT then executes the groupscanning proof with r o , and the carrier forwards the generated proof.
The owner can also provide the carrier with a specific key so that the integrity of a shipment of tagged products can be checked. For this application the owner selects a random number r t , computes k t = f (k; r t ), and then sends to the carrier (ID gp , r t , k t ) . The carrier generates a random number r c and challenges the GoT with: r t , r c . This information enables the authenticator tag to compute k t , and thus, the GoT can execute the grouping proof with k = k t and r sys = r c . The generated proof can be verified by the carrier.
